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Corresponding author: Chaoran Li ( lichaoran_@outlook.com ) Corresponding author: Alexandre Madelaine ( madelaine@rsm.nl ) Academic editor: René Orij
© 2026 Chaoran Li, Alexandre Madelaine.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication.
Citation:
Li C, Madelaine A (2026) When more is not always better: Non-linear and governance-layer effects of female representation on ESG performance. Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 100(3): 117-126. https://doi.org/10.5117/mab.100.166423
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This study investigates whether more female representation always leads to better ESG performance using European STOXX 600 firms from 2010 to 2023. Across firms, higher female representation in the top management team is associated with better ESG performance. We find limited evidence that this association is non-linear; if anything, the relationship appears to weaken at high levels of representation. Within firms over time, increases in board female representation weaken the positive association between top management female representation and ESG performance, suggesting substitution across governance layers. Overall, our findings suggest that more female representation is not always better for ESG performance.
Top management team, female representation, gender diversity, ESG performance, corporate governance, board–management interaction
The study highlights that adding more women to executive teams does not automatically improve ESG outcomes. Beyond numerical targets, firms should foster meaningful participation and cross-layer coordination between boards and management. Policymakers and organizations must design governance frameworks that empower diverse leadership to drive sustainability strategically and effectively.
Prior research finds that firms with high ESG scores tend to experience strong financial performance and access to finance (
Despite progress in recent years, women remain underrepresented in corporate leadership positions. According to the European Institute for Gender Equality (
Using multiple regressions on a sample of STOXX 600 companies, we examine two aspects:
Overall, our findings provide limited evidence that the positive impact of female representation in the TMT diminishes as the number of women increases, and more robust evidence that strong female representation on the board lessens the additional effect of having more women in the TMT—highlighting that more is not always better.
According to upper echelons theory (
Prior research highlights that various CEO characteristics play an important role in shaping firms’ social responsibility strategies (e.g.,
Although prior studies generally find a positive link between female leadership and ESG performance, several have proposed the existence of a critical mass of female leaders needed to drive meaningful changes (
Beyond a certain point, the resources and perspectives contributed by additional women in leadership may become redundant, reducing the marginal benefits of further female representation. Consistent with this view,
When a perspective becomes dominant rather than complementary, it loses its distinctive influence on strategic priorities. As ESG considerations become more institutionalized and less contested, they may receive less incremental attention and cognitive diversity, potentially leading to a deterioration in associated performance. First, because decision-makers’ actions depend on the issues they focus on (
Given these contrasting perspectives, we argue that the relationship between female representation and ESG performance could be either convex or concave, or both. We remain agnostic about the specific form and only hypothesize that a non-linear relationship exists:
H1: Female representation in TMTs has a non-linear relationship with ESG performance.
Corporate governance encompasses both boards and TMTs, with TMTs responsible for implementing ESG strategies under board oversight. While the gender composition of TMT may influence ESG performance, its effect could be shaped by board composition. Yet, the interaction between these two layers remains underexplored. This issue is particularly relevant because female representation on boards also contributes to stronger ESG performance (e.g.,
The relationship between board and TMT diversity can be conceptualized as additive, complementary, or substitutive:
Empirical studies on joint female representation on boards and TMTs produce mixed results. For instance, firms with high female representation in both layers tend to exhibit higher innovation (
H2: Board female representation does not moderate the relationship between TMT female representation and ESG performance.
We have selected firms from the STOXX 600 Index, following prior studies (e.g.,
The dataset initially includes 8,400 firm-year observations; after excluding those with missing values, 6,701 remain. To assess potential sample selection bias arising due to missing data, we compare included and excluded observations on key firm characteristics (company size, ROA, and leverage) using unpaired t-tests. Untabulated results indicate that firms with missing data are significantly smaller and exhibit higher asset profitability.
We present definitions of all our variables in Table
| Type | Name | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Dependent variables | ESGS | LSEG ESG score |
| ENS | LSEG Environmental pillar score | |
| SOS | LSEG Social pillar score | |
| Main independent variable | FTMT | Percentage of female executives |
| Moderating and control variable | FBOD | Percentage of female board members |
| Control variables | SIZE | Natural logarithm of total assets (in euro) |
| ROA | EBIT scaled by total assets | |
| LEV | Total debt scaled by total assets | |
| DUAL | Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO simultaneously serves as board chair, and 0 otherwise | |
| NBOD | Natural logarithm of the total number of board members | |
| CSRC | Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a committee related to CSR, ESG, or sustainability, and 0 otherwise |
Top management female representation, the independent variable of interest, is measured as the percentage of women in the top management team (FTMT). The moderating variable, board female representation, is measured as the proportion of female directors on the board (FBOD). This variable is also included as a control variable. Other control variables account for firm characteristics that may influence ESG performance beyond FTMT and FBOD. They include firm size (SIZE) (
Table
| Obs. | Mean | Median | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESGS | 6701 | 64.2 | 67.5 | 17.8 | 2.69 | 95.9 |
| ENS | 6701 | 65.2 | 70.3 | 23.3 | 0 | 99.1 |
| SOS | 6701 | 67.2 | 71.8 | 20.7 | 1.56 | 98.5 |
| FTMT | 6701 | 15.1 | 14.3 | 13.6 | 0 | 100 |
| FBOD | 6701 | 28.6 | 30 | 13.7 | 0 | 75 |
| SIZE | 6701 | 16.4 | 16.2 | 1.73 | 10.6 | 21.7 |
| ROA | 6701 | 6.0 | 5.13 | 5.02 | -0.84 | 18.0 |
| LEV | 6701 | 24.8 | 23.9 | 15.2 | 0.01 | 132 |
| DUAL | 6701 | 0.119 | 0 | 0.324 | 0 | 1 |
| NBOD | 6701 | 2.37 | 2.4 | 0.34 | 0.69 | 3.64 |
| CSRC | 6701 | 0.832 | 1 | 0.374 | 0 | 1 |
The variable NBOD, representing the natural logarithm of the number of board members, has a mean of 2.37 and varies between 0.69 and 3.64. Approximately 83% of firm-year observations report the presence of a CSR committee (CSRC), while only 11.9% exhibit CEO duality (DUAL). The average firm size (SIZE) is 16.4, with an average ROA of 6.0%. Leverage (LEV) averages 24.8%, suggesting a moderately leveraged capital structure, though some firms exhibit substantially higher leverage levels.
Before presenting the main results, we first test whether a higher proportion of women in the TMT is positively associated with ESG performance by estimating the following regressions:
ESGSi,t or ENSi,t or SOSi,t = β0 + β1 FTMTi,t + Controlsi,t + Fixed effects + ε (1)
Controls include all variables identified as control variables in Table
| ESGS | ENS | SOS | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| FTMT | 0.1260*** | 0.0222 | 0.0973** | -0.0367 | 0.1084*** | -0.0525** |
| (0.0239) | (0.0203) | (0.0464) | (0.0274) | (0.0269) | (0.0260) | |
| FBOD | 0.1292*** | 0.1310*** | 0.1752*** | 0.0733** | 0.0959** | 0.0974*** |
| (0.0336) | (0.0223) | (0.0414) | (0.0306) | (0.0447) | (0.0288) | |
| SIZE | 5.5614*** | 4.8893*** | 6.4693*** | 6.5191*** | 5.8904*** | 4.7406*** |
| (0.4190) | (0.8439) | (0.5810) | (1.1310) | (0.5083) | (1.2312) | |
| ROA | 0.1005 | 0.0108 | 0.1315 | -0.0119 | 0.2643** | 0.0773 |
| (0.0903) | (0.0411) | (0.1667) | (0.0601) | (0.1122) | (0.0603) | |
| LEV | 0.0154 | -0.0686*** | 0.0580 | -0.0266 | 0.0228 | -0.1139*** |
| (0.0442) | (0.0260) | (0.0571) | (0.0375) | (0.0506) | (0.0357) | |
| DUAL | -1.5591 | -1.5428** | 2.3368* | -1.1878 | 0.6866 | -0.7745 |
| (1.0449) | (0.7596) | (1.2206) | (0.9730) | (1.2746) | (1.0483) | |
| NBOD | 2.8309** | 3.2161** | 5.9666*** | 4.6885** | 6.3735*** | 5.8920*** |
| (1.1748) | (1.5068) | (1.9677) | (1.9062) | (1.8535) | (1.6486) | |
| CSRC | 13.9484*** | 8.4771*** | 16.2321*** | 10.7175*** | 13.0039*** | 8.9008*** |
| (1.2332) | (0.8117) | (1.8791) | (1.1652) | (1.4043) | (1.0774) | |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Firm FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 |
| R2 | 0.597 | 0.861 | 0.546 | 0.848 | 0.517 | 0.823 |
With industry fixed effects (Columns (1), (3), and (5)), the coefficients of FTMT are consistently positive and significant (p-value < 0.01 in Columns (1) and (5), p-value < 0.05 in Column (3)). A 10-percentage-point increase in FTMT is associated with a 1.260-point rise in ESGS. This result is consistent with previous research using industry fixed-effects models (e.g.,
To test H1, we estimate a polynomial regression model specified as follows:
ESGSi,t or ENSi,t or SOSi,t = β0 + β1 FTMTi,t + β2 FTMT2i,t + Controlsi,t + Fixed effects + ε (2)
The results are presented in Table
| ESGS | ENS | SOS | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| FTMT | 0.2017*** | 0.0559 | 0.1553* | -0.0159 | 0.1811** | 0.0061 |
| (0.0576) | (0.0395) | (0.0827) | (0.0525) | (0.0726) | (0.0492) | |
| FTMT2 | -0.0018* | -0.0008 | -0.0014 | -0.0005 | -0.0018 | -0.0014 |
| (0.0011) | (0.0008) | (0.0016) | (0.0010) | (0.0014) | (0.0010) | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Firm FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 |
| R2 | 0.598 | 0.861 | 0.546 | 0.849 | 0.518 | 0.823 |
To complement the polynomial analysis, we also conduct untabulated regressions to examine whether the effect of FTMT varies across different thresholds. Specifically, we regress ESGS on FTMT, an indicator variable equal to one if FTMT exceeds a given threshold, and the interaction between FTMT and this indicator. The thresholds considered are 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40. We find that the interaction term is consistently negative but not statistically significant, implying no meaningful difference in the effect at higher thresholds.
Because the coefficients are largely insignificant, we do not provide unambiguous support for H1 and do not conclude that the relationship between female representation in TMTs and ESG performance is non-linear.
To test H2, we estimate the following model including the interaction between FTMT and FBOD:
ESGSi,t or ENSi,t or SOSi,t = β0 + β1 FTMTi,t + β2 FBODi,t + β3 FTMTi,t × FBODi,t + Controlsi,t + Fixed effects + ε (3)
The results are presented in Table
| ESGS | ENS | SOS | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| FTMT | 0.2047*** | 0.1465*** | 0.2244** | 0.1321** | 0.1823** | 0.0810 |
| (0.0703) | (0.0431) | (0.1102) | (0.0550) | (0.0819) | (0.0555) | |
| FBOD | 0.1624*** | 0.1832*** | 0.2288*** | 0.1443*** | 0.1271** | 0.1535*** |
| (0.0448) | (0.0287) | (0.0560) | (0.0404) | (0.0573) | (0.0366) | |
| FTMT × FBOD | -0.0024 | -0.0038*** | -0.0039 | -0.0051*** | -0.0023 | -0.0041*** |
| (0.0018) | (0.0011) | (0.0026) | (0.0015) | (0.0022) | (0.0015) | |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Industry FE | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Firm FE | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Observations | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 | 6701 |
| R2 | 0.597 | 0.862 | 0.547 | 0.850 | 0.518 | 0.824 |
This paper investigates how female representation within top management teams is associated with ESG performance in European firms, with particular attention to potential non-linear effects and cross-layer interactions with boards. The study employs fixed-effect models using panel data from companies in the STOXX 600 Index between 2010 and 2023. We have used the percentage of women in the executive team as a proxy for TMT female representation, and measured ESG performance using ESG scores from LSEG. After establishing that higher female representation is associated with higher ESG performance across firms but not within firms over time, our main results are twofold.
First, there is only limited evidence of a non-linear relationship between female representation in TMTs and ESG performance. As the proportion of women increases, the improvement in ESG performance becomes marginally smaller but the coefficients are mostly not significant. If anything, our results provide no evidence in support of critical mass theory (
Second, we find that the positive association between TMT female representation and ESG performance is weaker when the board includes a higher proportion of women, suggesting a potential substitution effect between the roles of female directors and executives. This indicates that the non-linear effect of TMTs mostly operates across governance layers, and not within. More broadly, these findings enhance our understanding of how female representation interacts across different layers of corporate governance, contributing to the literature on the interdependence of those layers (
From a practical perspective, the observed offsetting effect between the TMT and the board suggests that increasing female representation across governance layers does not automatically generate synergies, as overlapping roles or conflicting dynamics may limit the overall benefits. Organizations should therefore aim to foster a context-sensitive and gender-balanced leadership structure that goes beyond numerical representation to consider the specific roles, responsibilities, and interactions of female leaders. Equally important is ensuring alignment between the board and the TMT to promote cohesive decision-making and reduce governance frictions that could hinder ESG performance.
This study has several limitations, which also open avenues for future research. First, while we examine the overall relationship between female representation and ESG performance, we do not investigate the underlying mechanisms through which strategic objectives are translated into concrete practices that drive ESG outcomes. Distinguishing the influence of key leadership positions, such as CEOs, CFOs, or CSOs—whose responsibilities are more directly linked to ESG—could provide a clearer understanding of how gender diversity translates into improved performance. Future research should also explore how sustainability strategies are differently designed and operationalized by women in practice. These questions may be particularly well suited for qualitative approaches, such as interviews or case studies, which can capture the processes and decision-making dynamics that quantitative analyses alone cannot fully reveal.
Second, while we empirically treat critical mass theory and diminishing marginal effects of women as opposing mechanisms, both may coexist in practice. It is possible that a minimum level of female representation is required to generate an effect, after which the marginal influence of additional women declines. We do not explicitly consider this possibility, although we remain cautious in interpreting our results. What our analyses indicate is that, in our data, a diminishing marginal influence of women, as captured by a second-degree polynomial specification and untabulated threshold regressions, is more prevalent than evidence consistent with the need of a critical mass.
Third, we acknowledge that our findings regarding governance layers may partly reflect that some women serve on both the TMT and the board. While we cannot account for this potential double counting in our sample, future research could examine whether the results hold in settings where TMT and board memberships are clearly distinct, providing a cleaner test of the interplay between women across governance layers.
C. Li – Chaoran is an alumnus of the MSc Accounting & Financial Management, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Dr. A. Madelaine – Alexandre is an Assistant Professor of Accounting, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Chaoran Li is one of the winners of the MAB Thesis Award 2025. This article is based on her master thesis.