Research Article |
Corresponding author: Evelien Reusen ( reusen@rsm.nl ) Academic editor: Paula van Veen-Dirks
© 2022 Evelien Reusen.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes, provided that the article is not altered or modified and the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Reusen E (2022) To imitate or not to imitate? A note on control misalignment in supply chains. Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie 96(9/10): 355-361. https://doi.org/10.5117/mab.96.82731
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For supply chain partners to realize existing potentials, effective controls are necessary to serve as the underlying basis of relationship management. The design and use of controls are ideally based on the principle of matching, in line with the transaction context. Yet, misaligned control structures commonly exist in practice – and this is often associated with negative performance implications. Based on prior research findings, this article points to imitating behavior as a potential source of control misalignment in supply chains. To imitate appropriately and, hence, avoid situations of misalignment, firms should consider tailoring and adapting the control structure to meet specific relationship needs.
Management control systems, transaction context, misalignment, supply chain, imitation
Although imitation is a commonly used approach to facilitate the decision-making process, there are barriers to spreading best practices. Those responsible for designing management control systems – including managers, management accountants, and controllers – should be aware that every cooperation is different and that things may go wrong when imitating other companies’ control practices without questioning their applicability to the specific context.
Understanding how firms inform the design and use of management control systems (MCSs) to manage their interfirm relationships is important, as choosing appropriate control mechanisms is imperative for managing interfirm relationships effectively.
Predominantly informed by transaction cost economics (TCE), prior research on interfirm collaborations, and supply chain relations in particular, has considered transaction risk as a key determinant of MCS choices (
According to this perspective, MCS design is essentially based on the principle of matching, where firms install MCS that align with the transaction context to mitigate underlying transaction risk. Although this notion of alignment is widely accepted, an organization’s control structure and transaction context may often be out of alignment (
Specifically, by considering imitative behaviors in supply chain triads, it sheds light on the behavioral mechanisms underlying MCS design, and recognizes that MCS decisions can have consequences not only in the focal dyadic relationship, but also in adjacent relationships.
Supply chains typically involve multiple interconnected relationships (
Against this background, this article embraces – and calls for – a broader network perspective as to further our understanding of how MCS are established. The central issue reviewed in this article is whether the use of MCS in the first-tier results in imitative MCS usage in the second-tier, even regardless of the specificities of the transaction context. Based on survey data collected from firms involved in supply chain triads,
From a practical perspective, by providing a deeper understanding of the process of MCS design, this article offers guidance for organizations to achieve a better “fit”. It has been widely documented that organizations, and by extension individuals within the organization, rely on imitation in decision-making processes (
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background and explains the research setting, expanding the view beyond dyadic interactions. Next, I summarize insights on the occurrence (section 3) and potential consequences (section 4) of MCS imitation and misalignment in supply chains. Section 5 concludes and highlights both theoretical and practical implications.
Traditionally, much research that studies the use of accounting and control systems in supply chains is guided by a transaction cost economics framework and is particularly concentrated on how these systems are matched with the transaction context (
Accordingly,
A triadic/dual dyadic supply chain configuration. Note: The first-level dyad involves the relationship between the customer and the buyer. The second-level dyad involves the relationship between the buyer and the supplier. The arrows indicate the direction of MCS usage considered in this article. [Adopted from:
The control literature suggests that a MCS typically consist of formal and informal controls (
According to
However, while replicating the exact strategies of other firms may be perceived as safe, this simple imitation may not always be effective because outcomes depend on the context in which an organization operates (
In particular,
In order to examine MCS imitation as a potential explanation for control misalignment,
The study took a multi-step approach in first determining the extent to which MCS usage fits the transaction context according to the TCE logic, thereby arriving at a measure of misalignment; i.e. the residual from the regression that relates transaction context to MCS usage, and subsequently examining the association between the observed misalignment and imitation as a potential driver.
Three elements characterizing the transaction context were considered, namely uncertainty, interdependence, and duration. To assess MCS usage, buyers were asked to indicate the extent to which their firm uses a variety of control mechanisms to manage supplier relationships, including outcome, behavior, as well as social controls.
Overall, findings indicate that firms design MCS in accordance with the TCE reasoning, but with substantial unexplained variance. Subsequent analyses reveal that firms control their upstream suppliers, partially, by imitating how their downstream customer controls them. For this purpose, the study identified the extent to which the buyer manages its relationship with the supplier in the same way as the customer did towards them
In other words,
It is commonly assumed that imitating successful ideas or practices from other firms is a reasonable and beneficial strategy; however, I provide a word of caution in that imitation, even of ‘best’ practices, is not always desirable.
While firms may be inclined to and have good reasons to copy MCS throughout the supply chain, the transaction context of the upstream relationships does not necessarily mirror that of the downstream one. In this case, as shown by
For example, for complex exchange relationships in the second tier involving high levels of uncertainty or interdependencies, MCS imitation would only be effective if the first-tier relationship is also characterized by high uncertainty or interdependencies. If not, the decision to imitate MCS from the first tier to the second tier may result in the employment of insufficient MCS, exposing the firm to substantial residual risk. By contrast, the potential consequences of imitating MCS that provide more control than is needed given the transaction risks faced, may include a loss of flexibility or offense of another party’s sense of autonomy and cause reactance. For instance, when the second-tier relationship has been in place for a long-time and entails high levels of trust and reduced goal conflicts, MCS imitation would only be effective if the first-tier relationship has also been in place for a long-time. If not, extensive MCS might be copied from the first tier to the second tier, which might lead to excessive costs and, perhaps even more importantly, is likely to foster an atmosphere of distrust and may potentially damage the relationship. Conversely, adopting a relatively simple MCS structure in a relationship that only recently has been established would be inadequate, as these typically require higher levels of monitoring and safeguarding tactics.
Misalignment, in this sense, imposes either insufficient MCS, thus exposing firms to substantial residual risks, or excessive MCS, that is, involving more control than needed given the transaction risks faced (
Note that, while
Of direct practical relevance, those responsible for the design of MCS should be wary of the potential adverse effects when imitating so-called best practices from other firms without questioning their applicability in the specific context. For many managers, imitation is an important fact of organizational life, assisting in their decision-making process. However, one should not fall prey to common imitation heuristics such as “imitate the majority” or “imitate the successful” without further thought – rather to carefully evaluate the context and “imitate if similar” or, otherwise, knowledgeably adapt to the specific relationship conditions.
Additionally, realizing that misalignment might occur due to imitation and imperfect adoption of MCS in interfirm relationships, this should trigger efforts by inappropriately aligned organizations to reduce their degree of misalignment (
This article discusses the role of imitation in the establishment and contagion of MCS in supply chains. Since interorganizational imitation shows to be significant factor in MCS decisions, it merits additional consideration in the study of interfirm control. Based on
By describing imitation effects, new insights on the traditionally assumed context-control relationship emerge. The connection between interfirm control choices and transaction context has been a long-standing concern of accounting scholars (
The evidence that firms sometimes pursue mimetic actions despite the possibly resulting mismatch is notable, and suggests limits to successful imitation. To the extent that organizations simply imitate practices they believe have been beneficial elsewhere, without reflecting on the context in which these practices are used, the transaction may be controlled in ways that are suboptimal if the transaction context alone would be considered. Thus, beyond imitating MCS of organizations that are perceived as being successful (
Another recommendation for managers, accountants and controllers is to assess how well- or misaligned the firm’s MCS structure is, and revise and adjust MCS choices where needed. In their decision-support role, accountants and controllers are ideally positioned to help their firms understand not only the importance to avoid but also the need to adjust misaligned control structures, depending on the specific circumstances and/or preferences, and to mobilize the required resources to do so.
Dr. Evelien Reusen is als Associate Professor verbonden aan Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University.